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NEW YORK’S EDUCATION FINANCE
LITIGATION AND THE TITLE VI WAVE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL
EQUITY V. STATE*
Sarah S. Erving**
Above all things, I hope the education of the common
people will be attended to; convinced that on their good
sense we may rely with most security for the preservation
of a due degree of liberty.1
INTRODUCTION
Nearly fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court
decided in Brown v. Board of Education2 that state action
maintaining racially segregated schools violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.3 Since
Brown, public education policy has remained a critical issue in
our nation’s jurisprudence. In holding that separate is inherently
unequal, the Court established that equality in education is the
* 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (“CFE I”), remanded to 719 N.Y.S.2d
475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
** Brooklyn Law School Class of 2002; M.A., St. John’s College, 1999;
B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1995. The author wishes to thank
her Dad and Felipe for their extraordinary support in everything she pursues.
The author also wishes to thank her students at I.S. 164 who were the
inspiration for this note.
1
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (1787), available at
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
2
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that state
mandated segregation in schools violates the Equal Protection Clause).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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ideal our schools should achieve.4
Today, equality remains a core issue for education advocates,
but the battleground has shifted from racial segregation to
inequality in educational resources.5 With this change in focus,
the tools advocates use to obtain equality in schools have also
changed dramatically since Brown. Instead of relying on federal
and state equal protection clauses to litigate equality issues,
education advocates make claims based on education provisions
in state constitutions and, most recently, on regulations of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VI regulations”).6 Advocates
no longer rely on equal protection claims because the remedy
associated with those claims, forcing states to distribute money
equally among school districts, has had disastrous results.7
Instead of seeing an increase in funds to underfunded schools,
this remedy has inevitably caused states to reduce their per pupil
spending and student achievement.8
Despite our nation’s long history of deeming equality a vital
4

Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
See infra Part I (discussing the shift in education finance litigation from
equality to adequacy issues).
6
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2000). Since the
Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001), that
there exists no private right of action under Title VI regulations, two district
courts have held that Title VI regulations can be privately enforced through §
1983. See Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, available at
2001 WL 1013368 (E.D. Mich. 2001); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J.
Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001). See also
Alexander, 531 U.S. at 1523 (Stevens J., dissenting). For the purposes of this
note, I assume that Title VI regulations may be enforced privately through §
1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
7
See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); see also Molly S.
McUsic, The Law’s Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX
STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 114 (Jay P. Heubert
ed., 1999). “[T]he aftermath of equalization efforts inspired by school finance
litigation . . . show that on average, states that adopt plans that reduce local
funding inequalities tend to see lower than average growth over time in
educational spending.” Id.
8
See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing the problems associated with equal
protection claims).
5
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element of our democratic society,9 especially in education,10
courts are not willing to provide equality at the price of
mediocrity.11 Recognizing that strict notions of equality may
result in second-rate education for all, courts now determine if
the education financing system provides a minimum level of
education set by the education article of the applicable state
constitution.12 As a result, advocates seeking to reform public
school financing bring claims based on the failure of the state to
provide children with an adequate education.13 However, this
movement is waning due to the reluctance of courts to implement
the detailed and comprehensive remedies associated with
adequacy litigation.14 Holdings in New York public school
9

See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776) (stating that “[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal”); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 1 (2000) (“No government is legitimate that does not
show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over whom it claims
dominion and from whom it claims allegiance.”); JOHN P. MCKAY ET AL., A
HISTORY OF WESTERN SOCIETY 669 (3d ed. 1987) (claiming that “[t]he ideas
of liberty and equality—the central ideas of classical liberalism—have deep
roots in Western history”); Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech
delivered on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C. (Aug. 28,
1963), available at http://web66.coled.umn.edu/new/MLK/MLK.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2000) (“I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up
and live out the true meaning of its creed. We hold these truths to be
self-evident that all men are created equal.”).
10
See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that “[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal”).
11
See Jon Mills & Timothy Mclendon, Setting a New Standard for Public
Education: Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State to Make “Adequate
Provision” for Florida Schools, 52 FLA. L. REV. 329, 356 (2000) (stating that
“[a] finding of constitutional uniformity does not necessarily mean that the
system is good because, in fact, a uniformly poor system would be
constitutional”).
12
Id. at 340 (stating that “[t]he idea of focusing on adequacy as requiring
some basic level of educational quality was also attractive to those who
realized that equity arguments often failed in court or in the public forum by
pitting poorer districts against richer districts, raising poor schools only by
handicapping those schools that are succeeding”).
13
See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
14
See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
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financing cases tend to show that New York State is also
reluctant to provide remedies in equity and adequacy cases. The
New York Court of Appeals has thrice rejected plaintiffs’ federal
and state equal protection claims and twice rejected their
adequacy claims.15
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State,16 (“CFE I”) is the most
recent challenge to New York State’s public school financing
system. Upon defendants’ motion, the New York Court of
Appeals dismissed plaintiffs’ state and federal equal protection
claims.17 In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs successfully
alleged a cause of action under the Education Article of the New
York Constitution and under the Title VI regulations.18 Six years
later in 2001, plaintiffs won on those claims at the trial level,19
and the defendants quickly appealed.20 Plaintiffs’ success on
appeal will be determined to a large extent by the willingness of
the New York Court of Appeals to issue an enforceable remedy.
Equity claims have proven unworkable because their remedy
requires equal distribution of funding.21 Although the remedies
for adequacy claims do not require such distribution, they too
have proven unworkable as implementation requires a large
amount of judicial intervention.22 Because enforcement of Title
15

See Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); REFIT v.
Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1995); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State,
655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (“CFE I”).
16
655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995), remanded to 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2001).
17
Id. at 663.
18
Id. See also supra note 4.
19
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2001) (“2001 CFE”).
20
Richard Pé rez-Peña with Abby Goodnough, Pataki to Appeal Decision
by Judge on Aid to Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at A1.
21
See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
22
See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 384 (N.J. 1990). The
Abbott decision provided poor urban school districts in New Jersey with a
comprehensive plan to improve the state’s urban schools. Since then, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has made many additional rulings in an attempt to
implement the 1990 decision. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J.
1993); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 710
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VI remedies avoids the pitfalls of equity and adequacy claims,
Title VI regulations claims could be the new wave of education
finance litigation.
The courtrooms in nearly every state of the country have
entertained litigation attempting to overturn education financing
systems with varying degrees of success.23 Plaintiffs in these
cases are generally concerned community members, including
parents, teachers, and school boards.24 Defendants tend to be the
state education departments, city boards of education, or officials
acting under the color of law.25 Plaintiffs have won in nineteen
states, successfully overturning their states’ education financing
systems.26 However, plaintiffs have also lost claims in sixteen
A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000); Abbott
v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000).
23
See infra note 26-28 (listing cases).
24
For example, Campaign for Fiscal Equity is a New York State
not-for-profit corporation consisting of community school boards, students,
parents, and advocacy organizations. See CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 663.
25
For example, in CFE I, defendants are the State of New York and state
officials responsible for implementing New York’s funding scheme. 655
N.E.2d at 661.
26
See Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala.
1993); Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997); Roosevelt Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Shofstall v. Hollins,
515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 917
S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 1996); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90
(Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Serrano v. Priest,
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Sheff v. O’Neil, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996);
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y. of the Exec.
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Milliken v. Green, 212
N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich.
1972); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont.
1990); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997);
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d
273 (N.J. 1973); Bismarck Public Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D.
1994); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Abbeville County
Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt.
1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v.
Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist.,

ERVINGMACRO.DOC

276

2/25/02 1:27 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

other states,27 and in two states, courts have refused to adjudicate
the matter, holding that to do so would usurp the role of the
legislature.28
This note focuses on New York’s struggle for fair funding in
its public school system in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State
(“2001 CFE”)29 and argues that its Title VI holding should
motivate state legislatures to provide appropriate funding without
the need for extensive judicial intervention. Part I provides a
background of the national trends in school finance litigation, and
discusses 2001 CFE’s place among those trends. Part II
demonstrates that finance claims will only succeed if courts issue
enforceable remedies and that past school finance litigation
strategies have failed due to courts’ refusals to intrude upon the

19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d
1238 (Wyo. 1995); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d
310 (Wyo. 1980).
27
See Matanuska-Sustina Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391
(Alaska 1997); Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo.
1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Idaho Sch. for
Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913 (Idaho 1998); Thompson v.
Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State,
885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Charlet v. State, 713 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. App.
1998); Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm’r, 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995);
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Skeen
v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349
(Neb. 1993); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 647
(N.Y. 1995); Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Leandro v.
State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v.
State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1997); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding v.
State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976);
Withers v. State, 891 P.2d 675 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); City of Pawtucket v.
Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138
(Va. 1994); Scott v. Commonwealth, No. HC-77-1, 1992 WL 885029 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 1992); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000);
Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
28
See Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles,
680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill.
1999); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996);
Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
29
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
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province of state legislatures.30 Finally, Part III argues that
claims based on Title VI regulations will be successful because
Title VI, enacted pursuant to congressional spending power,
allows courts to enforce remedies by issuing injunctions “against
the payment of federal monies” to the state, “should the state not
develop a conforming plan within a reasonable period of time.”31
Part III further demonstrates that courts will consistently rule in
favor of plaintiffs who can show the state’s funding scheme
violates Title VI regulations because the enforcement mechanism
will prevent courts from interfering with a state legislature, “who
is better positioned to gauge the effects of reform on the state as
a whole.”32 This note concludes that advocates for education
finance reform should include Title VI claims in their pleadings
as they are most likely to lead to consistent plaintiff victories in
state and federal court.
I.

BACKGROUND

Educators have hailed 2001 CFE as “the most important
judicial decision since Brown.”33 Its strength reflects the
plaintiffs’ careful analysis of both national and New York finance
litigation, distilling thirty years of triumph and mistake into a
succinct rule of law: a funding system violates federal and state
law when it fails “to provide the opportunity for a sound basic
education.”34 The maxim did not reveal itself easily as “[c]ases
do not unfold their principles for the asking. They yield up their

30

See Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59 (commenting that New Jersey’s battle to
enforce its decision in Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990), “provide[s]
a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the
duties of a Legislature”); see also Comm. for Educ. Rights, 672 N.E.2d 1178;
Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186; Marrero, 709 A.2d at 956.
31
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970); see also Guardians
Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Pennhurst v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
32
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
33
Randi Weingarten, Getting Our Fair Share: Fair Funding For Public
Education, Address at Manhattan’s Public School 9 (Feb. 15, 2001).
34
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
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kernel slowly and painfully.”35 The following is a history of how
the 2001 CFE’s rule of law came to be.
A. A Synopsis of Education Litigation
1. Waves
Since the Supreme Court declared in San Antonio v.
Rodriguez36 that education is not a fundamental right, advocates
have pursued state constitutional claims as the avenue for
change.37 Rodriguez shut the door to education challenges in
federal courts but opened many doors in the state court systems,
resulting in a large amount of state education litigation.38 In an
attempt to understand the enormous amount of litigation, scholars
have placed the finance cases into categories based on the
plaintiffs’ litigation strategies.39
Scholars refer to the several litigation strategies employed by
advocates as “waves.”40 Plaintiffs using the first wave strategy
argue that the state’s funding system violates the Federal Equal
Protection Clause.41 Prior to 1973, this federal claim was

35

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 29
(1921).
36
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right).
37
See generally Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance
Litigation, and The “Third Wave”: From Equity To Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1151 (1995).
38
See supra notes 26-28 (citing over forty cases).
39
See, e.g., Erica B. Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right
to a Bilingual Education, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 87-92 (1974);
Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 335-42. In addition, scholars place states
into one of four categories depending on the strength of the language of the
education provision in the state’s constitution. Mills & Mclendon, supra note
11, at 342-47.
40
See Grubb, supra note 30, at 87-92; Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11,
at 335-42.
41
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that “[n]o state shall deny . . . to
any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws”).
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successful in several state courts.42 Rodriguez, however, marked
the end of the first wave of education litigation.43 In Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right,
and thus, state education financing systems need only be
“rationally related” to an important state interest.44 Some courts,
however, have ruled favorably on the federal claim, maintaining
that state financing schemes do not even pass the standard of
rational basis review.45
The second wave, also known as the “equity” wave, is an
attempt to answer Rodriguez’s bar to federal education
litigation.46 Advocates argue in state courts that the funding
systems violate states’ equal protection and education provisions
of their respective constitutions.47 Most scholars agree that,
although more fruitful than the first wave, the second wave
creates confusion for advocates due to courts handing down
inconsistent rulings.48 Scholars also agree that the courts usually
disregard equity claims because second wave remedies merely
level out funding, that is, they take funding from the wealthy and

42

See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d. 1241 (Cal. 1971) (holding that
the state’s system of funding was inequitable in violation of the Federal Equal
Protection Clause).
43
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (holding that education is not a
fundamental right under the Federal Constitution and therefore financing
schemes would be reviewed only for rationality).
44
Id.
45
See, e.g., Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 917 S.W.2d 530
(Ark. 1996).
46
See Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 336-37.
47
See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (holding that
the state’s education system was inadequate under the state’s Equal Protection
Clause); Bismark Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994)
(holding that the state’s funding system was inequitable under the state’s Equal
Protection provision).
48
See, e.g., Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 337 (citing Frank J.
Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts: The Aftermath of San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 551 (1996)) (stating that “[t]he result of the second equity wave was a
patchwork of inconsistent state court decisions, continuing legal uncertainty as
to the sufficiency of many education finance systems”).
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give it to the poor.49
For example, in Serrano v. Priest,50 the California Supreme
Court ordered that the state spend an equal amount of money
financing rich and poor school districts. The court order resulted
in Proposition 13,51 which placed strict limits on property taxes,
pushing California’s average spending per student downward
relative to the rest of the country.52 As a consequence, California
placed forty-second in the nation in per pupil spending, down
from fifth.53 Some scholars suggest that equalizing spending does
not guarantee “that all school districts within a state spend
enough money per pupil to provide all with an adequate
education.”54 In November 2000, attempting to combat its
declining quality of education, California put to the voters
Proposition 38,55 which would have given every student a $4,000

49

See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School
Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 155 (1995). Criticizing the equity
wave, Enrich states: “While the demand for equal treatment by government
has a powerful initial allure, the concrete application of that demand to
education has proven deeply threatening to other powerful societal values.” Id.
at 155. See also McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 164 (Ga. 1981)
(showing vehement opposition to equalizing funding, the court states that
“[n]owhere in [Georgia’s] Constitution is there any obligation of the state to
equalize educational opportunities”); Michael Rebell, Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, Blueprint for Better Schools: Definition of a Sound Basic Education,
Statewide Fair Funding Principles for Effective Accountability (Fall 1998)
[hereinafter Blueprint] (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy) (stating
that “[t]he state should increase aid to poor districts but should not impose
ceilings on expenditures of any other districts”).
50
557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
51
CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 4.
52
See generally Seebach, Equal School Funding Doesn’t Pass the Test,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 30, 1994, at B10.
53
Editorial, The Fight for a Sound Education, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2000, at A24. But see CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, YEARBOOK 2000: THE
STATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 148 (2000) (ranking California thirty-fifth in
the 1995-96 school year with a per student expenditure of $4,973).
54
Andrew Reschovsky, Fiscal Equalization and School Finance, NAT’L
TAX J., Mar. 1, 1994.
55
2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 38.
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voucher, enabling each child to attend a private school.56
Proposition 38 did not pass, but the state’s reaction to equal fund
distribution became a lesson for advocates in education finance
reform.57 Advocates realize that a successful claim must not take
away funding from the wealthier districts; it must only increase
funding in the poorer districts.58
Courts view the aftermath of Serrano as a disaster that should
be avoided at all costs.59 For this reason, many courts dismiss
both state and federal equal protection claims altogether.60
Courts’ fears of Serrano’s “Robin Hood” solution has made
equal fund distribution an increasingly unattractive remedy and
hence an unsuccessful claim.61
In response to the failure of state and federal equal protection
claims, many advocates instead claim violations of state
constitutions that require or are interpreted to require a minimum
level of education quality.62 This “adequacy” argument is known
56

Id. at § 4(d)(1). See generally Ted Halstead & Michael Lind, The
National Debate over School Funding Needs a Federal Focus, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2000.
57
See, e.g., McUsic, supra note 7.
58
Blueprint, supra note 49 and accompanying text (suggesting that New
York adopt a school financing plan that provides adequate funding for poor
districts without taking money from wealthier districts).
59
See, e.g., Seebach, supra note 52, at B10 (“[California’s] slide into
educational decrepitude began with . . . Serrano.”); see also McUsic, supra
note 7, at 112 (stating that “California is now becoming the best argument
against it own school financing approach. . . . Only seventeen states spend less
per pupil on public education, and Mississippi is the only state with lower
average reading proficiency scores.”).
60
See, e.g., CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 663.
61
See Robert W. Wassmer, School Finance Reform: An Empirical Test of
the Economics of Public Opinion, 25 PUB. FIN. Q. 393 (1997), available at
1997 WL 13741398.
62
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989) (citing KY. CONST. § 183) (holding that the education system was
inadequate under the state education provision that states “[t]he General
Assembly shall . . . provide for an efficient system of common schools”);
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994)
(citing ARIZ. CONST. art. XI § 1) (invalidating an education funding system as
inequitable under the education provision of the state constitution providing
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as the third wave in finance litigation.63 Third wave litigation
avoids the “Robin Hood” effect by focusing on the adequacy of a
district’s financing scheme.64 In so doing, the adequacy wave
necessarily focuses, to some extent, on the language of education
provisions in state constitutions. For example, in Seattle School
District Number 1 v. State,65 the Supreme Court of Washington
held that the education system was inadequate under the state’s
education provision.66 The court held that the legislature failed to
meet its “paramount duty” to fully fund the school system as
required by the Washington State Constitution.67
The second and third waves proved increasingly more
successful as state courts used the claims to overturn nineteen
state education systems rendering them unconstitutional.68
Although preferable to equity claims, adequacy claims present
their own problems. Some courts admonish those states where
the judiciary acts as a “self- appointed overseer of education.”69
In City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun,70 the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island criticized New Jersey’s long court battle to enforce the
remedy declared in Abbott v. Burke,71 stating that “[t]he volume
of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling
example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the
duty of the legislature.”72 Fear of judicial activism and judicial
that “[t]he Legislature shall . . . provide for the establishment and
maintenance of a general and uniform public school system”).
63
See Heise, supra note 37.
64
See Heise, supra note 37.
65
585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
66
WASH CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state to
make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or
sex.”).
67
Id.
68
See supra note 26 (citing those cases overturning the state’s education
funding scheme).
69
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995).
70
Id.
71
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
72
Id. (stating that the New Jersey Supreme Court took on the role of the
legislature and violated separation of powers in the process). But see Kevin M.

ERVINGMACRO.DOC

THE QUEST FOR QUALITY EDUCATION

2/25/02 1:27 PM

283

encroachment on the legislative branch has caused some courts to
relinquish their duty to interpret the constitution altogether.73
Four decisions in three states illustrate judicial refusal to
adjudicate first, second, and third wave claims on the grounds
that to do so would violate the doctrine of separation of powers.74
Mulcahy, Note, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the Most
Progressive State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 863, 876 (2000) (“Beyond providing the opportunity for
school-finance reform, the Robinson series of decisions reflect perhaps the
best example of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s activism.”).
73
See MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 201
(1982). The authors state:
When courts are properly operating within the sphere of principle as
defined by the Supreme Court, the institution of American
government that has been acknowledged (at least since Marbury v.
Madison) to have the responsibility for determining ultimate
constitutional principles, they cannot be said to be violating
separation-of-powers limitations or to have usurped policy roles of
other branches.
Id. at 201-02.
74
See Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles,
680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996) (refraining from adjudication on grounds of
separation of powers); Lewis v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999)
(holding that students have no cause of action under the state constitution in
alleging that the state has not provided an adequate education); Comm’n. for
Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1996) (refraining from
adjudication on grounds of separation of powers); Marrero v. Commonwealth,
709 A.2d 956, 963-64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (noting that “all matters,
whether they be contracts bearing upon education, or legislative
determinations of school policy or the scope of educational activity, everything
directly related to the maintenance of a ‘thorough and efficient system of
public schools’ must at all times be subject to future legislative control”). It
should be noted that at the time Coalition for Adequacy was decided, Florida
had weak language in its state constitution. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (1868)
(stating that “the legislature shall provide for a uniform system of public free
schools”). It has since amended its constitution to include stronger language.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (1998) (stating that it is the “paramount duty of the
state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing
within its border”). It is unclear whether new finance litigation would result in
a plaintiff victory given the stronger language. See generally Mills &
Mclendon, supra note 11, at 380-81. The new provision reads:
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Because courts want to avoid the remedies associated with
second and third wave litigation, the law in this area is
inconsistent.75 For this reason, advocates have taken the
opportunity to litigate claims based on Title VI regulations.76
These advocates claim that state funding schemes disparately
impact minority children.77 Because Title VI school finance
litigation is in its embryonic stage, scholars have not yet named
this fourth wave of litigation. This comment argues, however,
that claims based on Title VI through § 1983 constitute the new
and hopefully, final wave of litigation.
2. History of Education Litigation in New York
New York’s first Constitution of 177778 made no reference to
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the
State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to
make adequate provision for the education of all children residing
within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public
schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for
the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher
learning and other public education programs that the needs of the
people may require.
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Because statistics show that strong language does
not always result in success for the plaintiff, amending New York’s
Constitution to include stronger language would be a moral victory at best and
would do nothing to solve the enforcement problems attributed to third wave
litigation. See Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 387-409. The appendix of
the authors’ article indicates that even states with very strong language in their
constitutions are not assured a plaintiff victory. See Mills & Mclendon, supra
note 11, at 387-409. For example, despite the fact that the Georgia
Constitution states that education “shall be a primary obligation” of the state,
plaintiffs lost when they challenged the state’s funding scheme as inadequate
and in violation of equal protection. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d
421 (Ga. 1981).
75
Compare Abbott, 575 A.2d 359, with Pawtucket, 662 A.2d 40.
76
See, e.g., CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
77
Id.
78
N.Y. CONST. (1777). The Charter of Liberties and Privileges, adopted
in 1683 and re-enacted by the charter of 1691 predates the Constitution of
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education. The current Education Article first appeared in the
Constitution of 1894 and has remained unchanged.79 However,
many legislative decisions on education were made between 1777
and 189480 that allowed New York to develop a world-renowned
education system.81 New York’s rich history, recognizing the
importance of education as a means for the state’s intellectual and
material prosperity for all classes of people, is eloquently

1777. It remained the Constitution for the Colony until the American
Revolution in 1776 and also did not mention education. See CHARTER OF
LIBERTIES AND PRIVILEGES 1683, available at http://www.montauk.com/
history/seeds/charter.-htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2000).
79
N.Y. CONST. art. IX (1894) (“The legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the
children of this state may be educated.”).
80
See generally THE STATE EDUC. DEP’T, EDUC. AND THE 1967
CONVENTION: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PROPOSALS AFFECTING EDUCATION
WHICH MAY COME BEFORE THE CONVENTION 19 (1966). This book cites ten
legislative decisions: (1) establishment of the Regents (1784); (2) provisions
for public elementary schools (1812); (3) division of the state into local school
districts and local property tax support for public elementary schools (1812);
(4) creation of a separate state department to administer the public elementary
school (1812-1854); (5) discontinuance of state support for denominational
schools in New York City (1842); (6) state provisions for the professional
education and certification of elementary school teachers (1834-1844); (7)
state tax support for schools and a beginning toward state equalization of
educational opportunities (1851); (8) provisions for public and secondary
schools (1853); (9) provisions for state scholarships for higher education
(1865); and (10) free school principle adopted (1867). Id.
81
See State of New York, In Convention Document No. 62: Report of the
Committee on Education and the Funds Pertaining Thereto, 2 Documents /
Constitutional Convention (1894) (presented by Frederick W. Holls,
Chairman) [hereinafter Document No. 62]:
In the regard of other states and countries it is this university which
has given New York her reputation and her position in the literature
of education. At the world’s fair in Paris, in 1889, the Grand Prix,
the highest award was given to the Regents of the University in
recognition of the fact, which is well known to students of French
educational history, that Napoleon modeled the National University of
France upon the University of the State of New York.
Id. at 5.
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recorded in the Report of the Committee on Education82 for New
York State’s 1894 Constitutional Convention.83 The Committee
successfully argued that New York should have a provision for
education in its constitution.84 The provision states, in pertinent
part, “[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the
children of this State may be educated.”85
The notion of equal educational opportunity pervades the
Education Committee’s Report. The Committee, in arguing that
New York State should fund education stated the following:
In some way we have lost sight of the laws made in the
early days of New York, and the views held by the great
men who first gave shape to its policy. They made a law
which they meant should reach all classes, and to give a
chance for all to gain knowledge. . . . [Education] will
always get great aid from [private sources], but if it
depends upon that alone only a class can enjoy it.86

82

Id.
The education provision proposed by the Committee (“[t]he legislature
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of this State may be educated”) was adopted
by the Convention of 1894 and has since remained unchanged. Id. at 1.
84
New York’s current education provision dates back to 1894. See N.Y.
CONST. art. XI § 1.
85
Document No. 62, supra note 81, at 1.
86
Document No. 62, supra note 81, at 7. Throughout the document there
are references to the state’s intention that an adequate education should be
provided to all children in the State of New York. The Committee writes:
“[T]he people well know, or instinctively feel that it is the highest wisdom to
make their own schools so good that the rich will attend them, and to put
schooling before the poor in the light of a duty rather than a privilege.”
Document No. 62, supra note 81, at 8. They also write:
Prof. Huxley’s definition of a system of education worthy of the
name has become classical, as requiring an educational ladder with its
foot in the gutter and its top in the university, every single step and
rung complete and within the reach of every climber. The vision of
just this system was, in no doubt, in the minds of the founders of the
University of the State of New York, and it is for this Convention to
determine how far that vision shall now be realized.
83
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New York State continues to value education. Today, not only
does the media report extensively on education issues, but the
candidates for the 2000 New York Senate Race based major parts
of their campaigns on education.87
Concerned New Yorkers have channeled their energy into
New York State courtrooms where, in the past twenty years,
three major lawsuits have been filed in an attempt to overturn
New York’s education funding scheme.88 Finance litigation
precedent in New York was created in 1982 when the New York
Court of Appeals “modified” the lower court’s decision in
Levittown v. Nyquist.89 The lower court found that the state’s
public school financing system violated New York’s Equal
Protection Clause and Education Article of its constitution.90 The
Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the existing state funding
scheme to finance public education did not violate the equal
protection clauses of the federal or state constitutions, nor did it
violate the Education Article of the New York Constitution.91
However, the court left the door open for future third wave
litigation by holding that the New York Constitution requires the
state to provide enough funding so that every child receives a

Document No. 62, supra note 81, at 10.
87
See, e.g., Karen W. Arenson, Vision of CUNY as a Contender in
Select Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at B1; Jim Dwyer, A Financial
School Daze, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 12, 1997, at 3; Anemona Hartocolis,
Brooklyn School Breaks from the Pack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at B1;
Owen Moritz, African-Americans Gain in School, Lag in Income, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, July 30, 1998, at 28; Jacques Steinberg, Answers to an English
Question, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, at 37.
88
CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995); REFIT v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d
647 (N.Y. 1995); Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982). Ceaser
v. Pataki, No. 98 Civ. 8532, 2000 WL 1154318 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000),
is a recent federal class action lawsuit also attempting to overturn New York’s
funding scheme claiming Title VI violations.
89
439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982).
90
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (stating that “[t]he legislature shall provide
for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein
all the children of this state may be educated”).
91
Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 370.
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“sound basic education.” 92
Not discouraged, plaintiffs in Reform Educational Financing
Inequities Today (“REFIT”) v. Cuomo93 brought a lawsuit
challenging New York State’s school funding, claiming that
funding disparities between rich and poor school districts violated
New York’s education provision.94 Although they attempted to
revive the third wave adequacy claim left open in Levittown,
plaintiffs erred by only proffering second wave evidence of
inequities.95 Plaintiffs alleged that the system of education
financing in New York had resulted in such a “gross and glaring
inadequacy” as to warrant intervention by the courts.96 However,
because plaintiffs tried to prove their claim by showing the
“dramatic widening in tax-base gap between rich and poor
districts,” that is the inequities, the challenge failed.97 The
Second Circuit stated that plaintiffs failed to allege that students
were not provided with a sound, basic education required by the
court in Levittown.98
Attempts to overturn New York’s education finance scheme
have failed because of misguided pleadings. In Levittown,
plaintiffs failed to claim that children did not receive a “sound
basic education,” in other words, to allege “that the educational
facilities or services provided in the school districts fall below the

92

Id. at 369.
655 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1995).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
REFIT, 655 N.E.2d at 648 (emphasis added).
97
REFIT, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 655 N.E.2d 647
(N.Y. 1995):
We find that the Supreme Court properly found in favor of the
defendants, since the plaintiffs do not allege that their students are not
being provided with a sound, basic education. Since plaintiffs in this
case merely assert that there are disparities in the financing of rich
and poor school districts, and the Court of Appeals has already
determined in the Levittown case that such disparities are not
unconstitutional, we find that the complaint was properly dismissed.
Id. at 46.
98
439 N.E.2d 359.
93
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statewide minimum standard of educational quality and
quantity.”99 Instead, plaintiffs erroneously argued that the
“system results in grossly disparate financial support.”100 As a
result, the court refused to follow Serrano v. Priest,101 and to
equalize funding, reasoning that such a holding would inevitably
result in diminished quality of education.102 Similarly, in REFIT,
the New York Court of Appeals recognized that disparities in
funding between rich and poor districts exist, but refused to
equally distribute education funding between them.103 Because
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that students were receiving
education below minimum standards, the court could not rule
appropriately on the adequacy theory.104
B. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State: A Procedural
History
For the third time in twenty years, plaintiffs brought a lawsuit
to overturn New York’s education funding system.105 In May of
1993, CFE, a coalition of parents, students, educators and
organizations brought a lawsuit against the State of New York
claiming that the state’s funding scheme violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution,106 the Equal
Protection Clause107 and Education Article of the New York State
Constitution,108 and the Title VI regulations.109 At trial, the court
99

Id. at 363.
Id. at 361-62.
101
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977).
102
See supra notes 49, 61 and accompanying text (discussing why equity
claims are usually unsuccessful).
103
REFIT, 655 N.E.2d at 648.
104
REFIT, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (App. Div. 1993).
105
See Levittown, 439 N.E.2d 359; REFIT, 655 N.E.2d 647; CFE I, 655
N.E.2d 661.
106
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (stating that “[n]o state shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
107
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (stating that “[n]o person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof”).
108
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (stating that “[t]he legislature shall provide
100

ERVINGMACRO.DOC

290

2/25/02 1:27 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the first
and second wave equity claims based on the federal and state
constitutions, but denied their motion with respect to the third
wave adequacy claim and the fourth wave Title VI regulations
claim.110 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court’s decision.111 The court held that CFE properly
alleged that the defendants’ method of financing schools violated
both the Education Article of New York’s Constitution and the
Title VI regulations, and it remanded the case to the Supreme
Court for adjudication on those claims.112
Beginning October 12, 1999, the parties presented their
arguments to Judge Leland DeGrasse in New York County
Supreme Court.113 The court held that the defendants violated
both New York’s Education Article and the Title VI
regulations.114 Judge DeGrasse stated:
The education provided [to] New York City students is so
deficient that it falls below the constitutional floor set by
the Education Article of the New York State
Constitution. . . . With respect to plaintiffs’ claim under
Title VI’s implementing regulations, the court finds that
the State school funding system has an adverse and
disparate impact on minority public school children and
that this disparate impact is not adequately justified by any
reason related to education.115
for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein
all the children of this state may be educated”).
109
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2000) (prohibiting any recipient of federal
funding from “utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color,
or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a
particular race, color, or national origin”).
110
CFE v. State, 162 Misc. 2d 493, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
111
CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
112
Id.
113
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 478. The trial lasted seven months, seventy-two witnesses took
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1. The Third Wave Education Article Claim
CFE rectified the inadequate pleadings that plagued previous
attempts to reform New York’s education system by consciously
adopting third wave language consistent with Levittown’s
holding. “Plaintiffs here, unlike the Levittown plaintiffs,” Judge
DeGrasse noted, “specifically allege that the education provided
to thousands of New York City public school students falls below
minimum statewide standards and therefore deprives them of a
‘sound basic education.’”116 The plaintiffs’ meticulous attention to
the specific shortfalls in the pleadings of Levittown117 and
REFIT118 forced the court to “determine precisely what level of
education is required by the Education Article and whether
defendants’ financing scheme denies any schoolchildren that level
of education.”119
In determining whether the defendants violated the Education
Article, the court undertook a three part inquiry. First, the court
defined a sound basic education as the “constitutional floor set by
the Education Article” under which the quality of education may
not fall.120 According to the court, a sound basic education
consists of “the foundational skills that students need to become
productive citizens capable of civic engagement and sustaining
competitive employment.”121 Second, the court found that New
York City’s school children are not provided with the opportunity
to obtain a sound basic education in the city’s public schools.122
the stand, and over 4,300 documents were admitted into evidence. Id. at 480.
116
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss at 3, CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (No. 93-111070)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law].
117
439 N.E.2d at 363. Plaintiffs failed to claim that “educational facilities
or services provided in the school districts that they represent fall below . . .
minimum standard of educational quality and quantity.” Id.
118
655 N.E.2d at 648. Plaintiffs failed to claim that “students in their
district are receiving something less than a sound basic education.” Id.
119
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 116, at 11.
120
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
121
Id. at 487.
122
Id. at 549.
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In so finding, the court examined the “‘inputs,’ the resources
available to students in public schools,”123 and the “‘outputs,’ the
measures of student achievement, primarily test results and
graduation rates.”124 The court concluded that the “majority of
the City’s public school students leave high school unprepared
for more than low-paying work, unprepared for college, and
unprepared for the duties placed upon them by a democratic
society.”125
Finally, in the most difficult part of its decision, the court
decided that there is a “causal link” between the state’s funding
scheme and the meager opportunity for education in New York
City.126 In asserting that there is a causal link between education
funding and an opportunity for a sound basic education, the court
held that “increased educational resources, if properly deployed,
can have a significant and lasting effect on student
performance.”127 In addition, the court found that “the City’s
ability to contribute to education is hampered by its diversified
tax base, its higher costs for other municipal services, and by its
debt burden.”128 The court, however, determined that “it is the
legislature’s duty” to remove those barriers to educational
opportunity.129

123

The “inputs” examined by the court in its 2001 CFE decision are
teachers, school facilities, curricula, class size, and instrumentalities of
teaching such as textbooks, library books, and instructional technology. See
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 491-515. The court found that New York City’s
students are provided with “inadequate resources” leaving students
“unprepared for more than low-paying work, unprepared for college, and
unprepared for duties placed upon them by a democratic society.” Id. at 520.
124
Id. at 515-20. The court found that the “graduation/dropout rates and
performance on standardized tests demonstrate that students are not receiving a
minimally adequate education.” Id. at 520.
125
Id. at 520.
126
Id. at 478, 520-40.
127
Id. at 525.
128
Id. at 540.
129
Id.
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2. The Fourth Wave Title VI Regulations Claim
The plaintiffs also succeeded on their second claim, that the
state’s school funding scheme disparately impacts minority
students in violation of the Title VI regulations.130 Title VI
provides that “[n]o person in the United States, shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance.”131 Although a showing of intentional
discrimination is necessary under Title VI,132 the Supreme Court
has held that the Title VI implementing regulations are valid and
that disparate impact claims may be brought under them.133 The
implementing regulation provides that recipients of federal funds
may not do the following: “Utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or
have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program.”134
A validly stated cause of action under Title VI regulations has
two components. First, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing a
prima facie case “that a facially neutral practice has had an
adverse and disparate impact upon a protected class of people.”135
130

Id. at 478. The court decided 2001 CFE before the Supreme Court
decided Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001). In Alexander, the
Court held, 5-4, that no private right of action exists under Title VI
regulations standing alone. Id. However, since then, two district courts have
held that claims under Title VI regulations can be maintained under § 1983.
See Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, available at 2001 WL
1013368 (E.D. Mich. 2001); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J Dep’t. of
Envtl. Protection, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001).
131
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
132
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292 (1985); Guardians Ass’n
v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 583, 610 (1983); Regents of Univ. of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978); African American Legal
Defense Fund v. State, 8 F. Supp. 2d 204, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
133
See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292; Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584.
134
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2000).
135
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 541 (citing New York City Envtl. Justice
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If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a “substantial legitimate
justification” for the practice.136 If the defendant meets this
burden, the plaintiff can still prevail by showing either that “the
defendant overlooked an equally effective alternative with less
discriminatory effects or that the proffered justification is no
more than a pretext for racial discrimination.”137
In 2001 CFE, the court held that the evidence demonstrated
“the existence of a disparate adverse impact on minority students
caused by the State’s funding system.”138 The court measured the
disparate impact by comparing funding to enrollment figures.139
In doing so, the court found the following:
[Seventy-three percent] of the State’s minority public
school students are enrolled in New York City’s public
schools, minority students make up approximately 84% of
New York City’s public school enrollment, and New
York City receives less funding per capita, on average
than districts in the rest of the state.140
Furthermore, the court held as insufficient the four justifications
defendants articulated for the disparate impact.141 The court was
Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 69 (2d. Cir. 2000)); see also Georgia State
Conference of Branches of NAACP v. State, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir.
1985); Groves v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (M.D.
Ala. 1991).
136
Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
137
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 541 (citing Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d
387, 394 (3d Cir. 1999)).
138
Id. at 546.
139
Id. at 542.
140
Id. In comparing the funding per capita, the court found that New
York City consistently received less total state aid than its percentage share of
enrolled students. Id. Between the school years of 1994-95 and 1999-2000,
New York had approximately 37% of the state’s enrolled students and
received a percentage of total state aid ranging from 33.98% to 35.65%. Id. at
543.
141
Id. at 547.
First, defendants argue that school funding formulas are
wealth-equalizing and New York City is a relatively more affluent
school district. Second, they argue that directing funding according to
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particularly critical of the state’s argument that directing funding
according to districts’ average attendance rates, as opposed to
enrollment rates, is “related to the State’s legitimate objectives of
encouraging districts to keep attendance up and discouraging
their inflation of enrollment figures.”142 The court held that “[t]he
state’s choice to base school funding on districts’ average
attendance is unnecessarily punitive. It creates a perverse
direction of state aid by directing aid away from districts with
large numbers of at risk students.”143 Therefore, plaintiffs
established a violation of Title VI regulations.
3. The Remedy
Unlike remedies from second and third wave cases, 2001
CFE evades the remedy problems of past litigation strategies, that
is the problems of equalizing funding and judicial activism, by
placing the ultimate burden of creating a remedy on the state
legislature.144 The New York State Legislature is more likely to
develop an appropriate funding scheme given the nature of the
federal spending power; if the state legislature fails to comply
with the Title VI regulations, the state’s federal funding will be
revoked.145 This is a substantial motivating factor absent from
second and third wave claims.146
districts’ average attendance, rather than to enrollment, is related to
the State’s legitimate objectives of encouraging districts to keep
attendance up and discouraging their inflation of enrollment
figures. . . . Third, defendants argue that distributing transportation
and building aid on a reimbursement basis, which has historically
harmed the City, is justified. Fourth, defendants argue that their
formulas take student need into account.
Id.
142

Id.
Id. at 549.
144
Id. at 540 (stating that it is the “legislature’s duty . . . to reform how
education is financed in New York State”).
145
See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983);
see also infra Part III (discussing the remedy for violations of Title VI and its
regulations, including revocation of federal funds).
146
Enforcing old wave claims entails more litigation. The most notorious
143
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In holding that defendants violated both the Education Article
and the Title VI regulations, the court ordered a remedy
requiring the state legislature to revamp the state’s funding
scheme.147 The court purposely delegated the creation of the
remedy to the state legislature and gave three reasons for doing
so:
First, the Court of Appeals held . . . that the State
Constitution “imposes a duty on the Legislature to ensure
the availability of a sound basic education to all of the
children of the State.” Second, this action has focused
principally on how the current system affects New York
City, but any remedy will necessarily involve the entire
State. The legislature is in a better position to gauge the
effects of reform on the State as a whole. Third, the
legislature is better positioned to work with the Governor
and other governmental actors who have a role in
reforming the current educational system. In particular,
the Regents, SED (State Education Department) and BOE
(Board of Education) have far greater expertise than this
court in crafting solutions to the educational problems
discussed in this opinion. This expertise should guide the
State as it reforms the current system. There is no need,
at least at this time, for the court to supersede the
legislature, the Governor, the State Education
Department, and the Regents, in imposing a remedy.148
In its lengthy opinion, the court provided the legislature with
example is the ongoing litigation in New Jersey where the New Jersey
Supreme Court has twice rejected legislative reforms as insufficient to address
the inadequacies of the education system. See Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575
(N.J. 1994); Abbott v. Burke, 639 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); see also Sheff v.
O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that Connecticut’s legislature
failed to provide plaintiffs with a substantially equal education opportunity);
State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001) (rejecting a
legislature’s attempt to remedy unconstitutional school funding).
147
2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (ordering that “the defendants shall
put in place reforms of school financing and governance designed to redress
the constitutional and regulatory violations set forth in this opinion”).
148
Id. at 549-50 (quoting CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 665).
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guidelines to create an appropriate remedy and required
implementation of the remedy by September 15, 2001.149
Shortly after the court delivered its opinion, George Pataki,
the Governor of the New York, announced that he would appeal
2001 CFE.150 Notwithstanding the court’s deliberate deference to
the legislature, Pataki gave the following reason for his decision:
“You can’t have a judge running an entire educational system.”151
Ignoring the decision’s language, he stated that he “will challenge
the decision because we want to make sure that the responsibility
[to revamp the state’s education financing scheme] rests with the
elected officials.”152 Governor Pataki’s concerns are misplaced.
The court was conscious of its role as interpreter of the law and,
as such, declared the state’s actions unconstitutional and in
violation of federal regulations.153 The court left the role of
creating education legislation to the state legislature, stating that
“it is the legislature that must . . . take steps to reform the
current system.”154
II. OLD WAVE ENFORCEMENT OF EDUCATION FINANCE
REMEDIES
The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in
another sense ephemeral. What is good in it endures.
What is erroneous is pretty sure to perish. The good
remains the foundation on which new structures will be
built. The bad will be rejected and cast off in the
laboratory of the years.155

149

Id. at 550-51. The legislature has not yet crafted a remedy because the
state has appealed the decision. Id., appeal docketed, No. 111070/93 (N.Y.
App. Div. Aug. 13, 2001).
150
See Richard Pérez-Peña, Pataki to Appeal Decision by Judge on Aid to
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at Al.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
See 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
154
Id. at 549-50.
155
CARDOZO, supra note 35, at 178.
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The second and third waves of litigation have been
unsuccessful or unpredictable at best.156 The second wave has
been unsuccessful because it requires courts to remedy violations
of the state and federal claims by forcing legislatures to distribute
funding equally to school districts.157 Similarly, the third wave
has not always been effective because it too requires a certain
amount of judicial activism to oversee the enforcement of
remedies.158 In some cases, the subsequent litigation enforcing
remedies has taken years.159 For this reason, some courts have
criticized the courts that rule favorably on third wave claims
opining that they have inappropriately entered the political
thickets.160
A. The Equity Wave: Equality Means Mediocrity for All
Equal protection analysis begins with the identification of the
appropriate standard of review.161 Strict scrutiny, triggered by the
infringement of a fundamental right, does not apply in federal
cases in which the right claimed is education.162 Education is not
a fundamental right protected explicitly or implicitly by the
United States Constitution.163 Moreover, although it is generally
recognized that state constitutions may afford greater protection
than found under the equivalent provision in the United States

156

See infra Part II.A-B (discussing the shortfalls of both the equity and
adequacy waves).
157
See infra Part II.A (discussing the shortfalls of the equity wave).
158
See infra Part II.B (discussing the shortfalls of the adequacy wave).
159
See supra note 146 (discussing the numerous cases and years of
litigation required to enforce the Abbott, 575 A.2d 359, decision).
160
See City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995).
161
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17
(1973) (stating that the Court “must decide, first, whether the Texas system of
financing public education . . . impinges upon the fundamental right explicitly
or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial
scrutiny”).
162
Id.
163
Id.
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Constitution,164 the New York Court of Appeals has explicitly
provided that its Equal Protection Clause “is no broader in
coverage than the Federal Provision.”165
Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals in CFE I
dismissed both the federal and state equal protection claims
despite the plaintiffs’ compelling arguments that intermediate
scrutiny should be applied. Plaintiffs distinguished their case
from early education finance challenges by arguing that
thousands of New York City children are deprived of an adequate
education unlike the arguments made by plaintiffs in Rodriguez
and Levittown.166 Here, plaintiffs argued that this case is similar
to Plyler v. Doe, where the plaintiffs alleged that thousands of
alien children were being deprived of an education.167 In Plyler,
the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny, and held that
the state must further a substantial goal when denying a basic
education to undocumented alien children.168 Plaintiffs further
argued that because Plyler was decided eight days before the
court issued its decision in Levittown, the New York Court of
Appeals did not consider the full implications of the decision.169

164

See Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle,
42 Record, N.Y.C.B.A. 285, 299 (1987) (“In [New York], in fact, there is a
long tradition of reading the parallel clauses independently and affording
broader protection, where appropriate, under the State Constitution.”); see
also Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 255 (N.D. 1994).
165
Under 21 v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1, 8 n.6 (N.Y. 1985).
166
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 116, at 12-14 (“Plaintiffs’
allegation here that students are receiving an education below minimum
standards thus dramatically shifts the legal landscape, not only in regard to
claims under the New York State Constitution’s Education Article, but also
under the state and federal equal protection clauses.”).
167
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 206 (1982). The Court held that
defendants’ denial of a free public education to plaintiffs was not justified by a
showing that the denial furthered a substantial state interest. Id. at 230.
168
Id. at 224.
169
Plaintiff s Memorandum of Law, supra note 116, at 17 n.9. An
argument, not offered by plaintiffs in 2001 CFE, but may have convinced the
court that education is a fundamental right in New York, is based purely on
the history of education in New York and the intent of the framers of the
Education Article. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text (describing
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Arguably, the New York Court of Appeals also decided to
dismiss both the federal and state equal protection claims because
the equal protection remedies in education finance cases have
invariably led to court mandates requiring equal funding among
wealthy and poor school districts.170 In states where courts have
granted the equal protection remedies, the wealthy school
districts suffered huge budget cuts without much increase in
funding to the poorer school districts because the number of poor
school districts far exceeded the number of wealthy school
districts. In Levittown, the New York Court of Appeals exhibited
trepidation in requiring equal distribution of funding when it
stated that “[a]ny legislative attempt to make uniform and
undeviating the educational opportunities offered by the several
hundred local school districts . . . would inevitably work the
demise of the local control of education available to students in
individual districts.”171
As a result of the problems encountered in implementing
equity remedies, the courts have practically urged parties to plead
third wave adequacy claims. For example, when Virginia
plaintiffs brought second wave equality claims based on the
state’s Equal Protection Clause, the Virginia Circuit Court in
Scott v. Commonwealth172 refused to equate “high quality” with
the importance of education in New York as evidenced by historical
documents). For example, in Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997), the
Vermont Supreme Court held that its system of financing education deprived
children of an equal educational opportunity in violation of its constitution.
Despite the fact that the state’s Education Act lacks strong language like New
York’s, the court found a fundamental right on the basis of the history of
education in democratic civilizations, the United States, and Vermont. Id. at
393 (“[T]he greatest legislators from Lycurgus down to John Locke, have laid
down a moral and scientific system of education as the very foundation and
cement of a State.”). The court held that “in Vermont the right to education is
so integral to our constitutional form of government, and its guarantees of
political and civil rights, that any statutory framework that infringes upon the
equal enjoyment of that right bears a commensurate heavy burden of
justification.” Id.
170
See supra notes 46-61 (discussing the shortfalls of equity claims).
171
Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 367 (N.Y. 1982).
172
29 Va. Cir. 324, 1992 WL 886029 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 443
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“equality.”173 The court stated that “[t]he Virginia Constitution,
while establishing education as a fundamental right, does not as
written make equalized funding on the part of the Commonwealth
a constitutional right.”174 As if to ask future plaintiffs to make
third wave claims, the court compared the plaintiffs’ equity claim
to the adequacy claim in Rose v. Council for Better Education.175
The Virginia Circuit Court stated that “[t]he Rose plaintiffs
alleged that Kentucky public school students were receiving an
inadequate education, one that did not even meet minimal
standards.”176 Because the plaintiffs in Scott did not allege a third
wave adequacy claim, the court dismissed the case.177
Few courts strike down education funding schemes on the
basis of equity claims, making it clear that courts are aware of
the dangers that a state faces when it tries to provide equal
funding to all school districts.178 Hence, in the post-Serrano era,
courts that find funding systems in violation of their states’ equal
protection clauses are reluctant to issue remedies.179 For this
reason, advocates have ultimately come to rely on third wave
adequacy arguments to overturn funding schemes.180 However,
this reliance should be met with caution as more courts refuse
even third wave adequacy arguments on the grounds that the
remedies associated with them require excessive judicial
oversight.181

S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994).
173
Id. at *4.
174
Id. at *5.
175
790 S.W.2d 186, 207-08 (Ky. 1989) (holding that the Kentucky
Constitution requires substantial uniformity and equality).
176
Scott, 1992 WL 885029, at *5.
177
Id. at *6.
178
This is a result of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(holding that education is not a fundamental right protected by the Federal
Constitution).
179
See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the dissatisfaction that scholars felt in
the aftermath of equity cases such as Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal.
1971)).
180
See generally Heise, supra note 37.
181
See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
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B. The Adequacy Wave and Judicial Activism

Opposition to judicial activism in the realm of education
started most notably after the Warren Court decided Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954.182 The Warren Court affected a
change in the power relationships between branches of the
government, resulting in “a massive transfer of power from
elected officials . . . to [the judiciary].”183 The Court’s decision
to exercise its remedial power to supervise and maintain detailed
control over various school desegregation plans caused some
backlash on the part of conservative scholars.184 Hostility towards
the Court’s expanded power to bring about social reform,
initiated by the Warren Court in Brown, is a prominent factor in
the mixed results of adequacy claims.
Of course, not all courts take such a harsh stance. Many are
willing to exercise their remedial powers to bring about much
needed reform in inadequate school systems.185 However, even
the most progressive courts have expressed some trepidation in
182

See JOHN DENTON CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 7 (1973). Referring
to the Brown decision, the author states:
It was in the school desegregation decree that the Warren Court took
the plunge directly into the political and legislative thickets to bring
about what it considered to be desirable social and political reforms
and thereby introduced into the judicial process a sense of abandon
that the New Deal Court had only approached.
Id.
183
Id. at 8.
184
See id. at 6. The author states:
From all of the warped decisions of the Warren Court, serious
consequences have followed. Some of the results have been: . . . a
breakdown in law and order . . . federal court supervision of the
public schools in the most minute details . . . the flooding of the
country with pornography; the downgrading of religious training of
children in the public schools.
Id. at 10. The author goes on to link the remedial action of the Warren Court
in Brown to “death of the great cities” and eventually “[c]haos.” Id. at 11.
185
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 207-08
(Ky. 1989).
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issuing broad remedies that define guidelines for legislative
action.186 For example, in Rose v. Council for Better Education,
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the state’s education
system was inadequate under the state education provision, but
stayed its extensive remedial order allowing time for its
legislature to act on its own.187 The concept of giving deference
to the state legislature to formulate its own remedy before court
action permeates many of the recent education funding cases,
including 2001 CFE.188
To rely on the success of an adequacy claim is to rely on a
court’s view that it has the remedial power to bring about social
change, a recognized court function that still meets opposition in
a fair number of our nation’s courts.189 Although most scholars
agree that “[f]ew people in contemporary society see the effect of
Brown itself as anything other than a great triumph for justice,”190
they also agree that courts exercising their remedial power, like
the Warren Court in Brown, have “more often followed the
policies that are generally supported by liberals and opposed by
conservatives.”191 Therefore, even with a clear showing of
inadequacy, court implemented remedies are not always certain
to follow.
The old waves of equity and adequacy are ineffective or
unreliable at best because courts fear implementing the associated
186

See, e.g., Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59. “The volume of litigation and
the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the thickets that
can entrap a court that takes on the duty of the Legislature.” Id.
187
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 186; see also Paynter v. State, 220 N.Y.S.2d
712, 720 (2000) (encouraging the parties to “consider committing their
resources to the fashioning and application of remedies, and not to further
litigation and a court mandated solution”).
188
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the respective roles of state
legislatures and courts in 2001 CFE); see also Paynter, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
However, after encouraging the parties to develop their own remedy, the court
stated that “should this court find that the State has discriminated against the
[plaintiffs], the State will be held accountable and a remedy ordered.” Id.
189
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM
OR PRECARIOUS SECURITY? 24 (rev. ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1997) (1991).
190
Id.
191
Id. at 25.
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remedies.192 Equity remedies require states to distribute funding
equally among school districts and, in the aftermath of cases like
Serrano, are rarely implemented.193 In addition, because
adequacy remedies seek to implement an adequate education, and
because state definitions of an adequate education are
multi-faceted and comprehensive, remedies are difficult to
implement and enforce.194 Therefore, courts, in ruling for
plaintiffs on adequacy grounds, must often be prepared to
oversee the implementation and enforcement of the remedy for
years, which, in many cases, they are unwilling to do.195
III. TITLE VI AND ENFORCING FINANCE REMEDIES
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as
old as the Scriptures. . . . [T]he question is whether we
are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be
treated.196
It has been nearly thirty years since the first education finance
cases were litigated. For the first time, it seems, advocates have
found the proper tool to litigate such cases. Because Title VI was
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, its remedy avoids the
problems of past litigation strategies, and is therefore our best
hope for ending discriminatory funding in our nation’s public
schools.
The Spending Clause of Article I provides that “Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
192

See supra Part I.A.1, II (discussing the shortfalls of second and third
waves of litigation).
193
See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the dissatisfaction that scholars felt in
the aftermath of equity cases such as Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal.
1971)).
194
See, e.g., Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59; but see Abbott v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
195
See, e.g., Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59; State v. Campbell County Sch.
Dist., 19 P.3d 518, 526 (Wyo. 2001).
196
President John F. Kennedy, Television Address Introducing the Civil
Rights Bill (June 11, 1963).
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Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and Welfare of the United States.”197 The clause allows Congress
to spend its money to provide for the general welfare of the
United States. In other words, Congress, in exchange for federal
funds, can require recipients to comply with all of the
requirements of the statute.198 The use of congressional spending
power has been upheld in numerous situations.199 For example, in
South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute
conditioning the states’ receipt of federal highway funds on the
adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one.200 In the
decision written by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that
“[e]ven if Congress might lack the power to impose a national
197

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974).
199
See, e.g., id.; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (defining the
limits of Spending Clause legislation); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65
(1936) (holding for the first time that Congress can enact legislation pursuant
to the Spending Clause).
200
483 U.S. 203 (1987). The court in Dole articulated the scope of the
spending power. Id. at 207-08. First, the exercise of the spending power must
be in pursuit of the general welfare of the people. Id. Second, if Congress
desires to condition the states’ receipt of federal funds, it must do so
unambiguously. Id. Third, the conditions on federal grants might be
illegitimate if they are unrelated to federal interests, in particular national
projects or programs. Id. Fourth, other constitutional provisions may provide
an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds. Id. Title VI
satisfies the four criteria outlined by Dole. First, that Title VI is in pursuit of
the general welfare is undisputable; in fact, the Civil Rights Act has been
hailed by scholars as the most effective tool in ending insidious racial
discrimination. 24 U.S.C. § 2000d; see, e.g., Gary Orfield, Conservative
Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM
42 (Jay P. Huebert ed., Yale University Press 1999) (1998). The author states:
“The courts provided clear leadership only after Congress acted in 1964 and
1965 to transform civil rights law and the Johnson Administration
employed . . . the threat of cutoff of federal funds.” Id. The language of Title
VI unambiguously conditions the receipt of federal funds on compliance with
its provision. See infra note 207 (citing language of the relevant provision) and
accompanying text (discussing the effect of Spending Clause legislation). Also,
the federal funds relate to a particular national project, the education of
America’s children. Lastly, the goal of minimizing racial inequality is far from
unconstitutional. See Mills & Mclendon, supra note 11, at 334-35.
198
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drinking age directly, we conclude that the encouragement to
state action . . . is valid use of the spending power.”201
The need for Title VI legislation, enacted pursuant to the
Spending Clause in order to end discriminatory state action,
surfaced most notably in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of
Education.202 In the ten years between Brown and the enactment
of Title VI, “the Deep South remained almost entirely
segregated.”203 Because court ordered remedies to end
segregation were met with great opposition, Congress enacted
Title VI to facilitate integration: “The 1964 Act’s manifestation
of federal determination, at both the legislative and executive
levels, to end unlawful segregation played a major role in making
Brown a reality.”204
Title VI conditions the receipt of federal funds on a state’s
compliance with its guidelines.205 The statute provides that “[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the
201

Dole, 483 U.S. at 212. It should be noted that many scholars are wary
of the congressional spending power, fearing that the legislation enacted
pursuant to the Spending Clause could be overly coercive. See Lynn A. Baker,
Conditional Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1914-16 (1995)
(arguing that the four part Dole test is unworkable as it allows Congress to
infringe on state sovereignty in violation of the principles of federalism);
Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987) (arguing that conditions infringing on individual
rights should be struck down as unconstitutional). All are in agreement,
however, that Title VI is validly enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause. See,
e.g., Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the Spending Power to Circumvent City of
Boerne v. Flores: Why the Court Should Require Constitutional Consistency in
Its Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 490 (2000).
“The validity of Title VI as Spending Clause legislation is beyond question.”
Id. (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974)).
202
BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS 5l (1997).
203
Id.
204
Id.; see also STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 537 (3d ed. 1996).
The authors state that Title VI is “important not only because the threatened
fund cutoff provided an impetus for desegregation, but also because the
guidelines provided the courts with an escape from the morass of case-by-case
litigation over individual desegregation plans.” Id.
205
See 28 U.S.C. § 2000d.
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benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”206 The statute
was conceived of by President Kennedy who, during his
administration, requested that “Congress grant executive
departments and agencies authority to cut off federal programs
that discriminate against Negroes.”207 Title VI rests on the
principle that “taxpayers’ money, which is collected without
discrimination, shall be spent without discrimination.”208 In other
words, the legislators intended to reserve federal funds for those
states willing to end discrimination.209
Advocates are just realizing now that Title VI is more than a
tool to end desegregation, but also a tool to end the
discriminatory distribution of education funding.210 Its
effectiveness stems from its unique ability to enforce remedies. In
ruling for plaintiffs on Title VI regulation claims, courts will
avoid the old wave problems of equalization and judicial activism
by providing court enforcement of private remedies through the
revocation of federal funding. Congress’ clear intention was to
equip courts with such enforcement power:
We come then to the crux of the dispute—how this right
[to participate in federally funded programs without
discrimination] should be protected. And even this issue
becomes clear upon the most elementary analysis. If
federal funds are to be dispensed on a nondiscriminatory
basis, the only possible remedies must fall into one of two
categories: First, action to end discrimination; or second,
action to end payment of funds.211
The plurality in Guardians Association v. Civil Service
Commission of the City of New York laid out the framework for
remedies in Title VI disparate impact cases, stating that “where
206

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328-29 (1978) (app. to Opinion of Powell, J.).
208
110 CONG. REC. 6546, 7064 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff).
209
Id. at 1542 (statement of Rep. Lindsay).
210
See, e.g., 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
211
110 CONG. REC. 7065 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff), cited in
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 421 n.28 (1978).
207

ERVINGMACRO.DOC

308

2/25/02 1:27 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

legal rights have been invaded and a cause of action is available,
a federal court may use any available remedy to afford full
relief.”212 The Court specified that the relief “should be limited to
declaratory and injunctive relief ordering future compliance with
the declared statutory and regulatory obligations.”213 The Court
further added that to enforce the remedy, “it is presumed that
private litigants . . . are entitled to . . . the limited remedy
deemed available to the plaintiffs in Pennhurst v. Halderman.”214
In Pennhurst, the Court held that “relief may well be limited to
enjoining the Federal Government from providing funds to the
[state].”215 Similarly, in Rosado v. Wyman the Supreme Court
held that federally funded welfare recipients were entitled to
“declaratory relief and an appropriate injunction by the District
Court against the payment of federal monies” to the program
“should the State not develop a conforming plan within a
reasonable period of time.”216
Because Title VI is spending-power legislation, the remedy
for its violation allows courts to defer to state legislatures to
enact remedial legislation if it chooses. Not only may the state
legislature decide not to enact any law at all, but also, if it
chooses to remedy the violation, it may formulate the law in any
way that does not have a disparate impact on minorities. The
Supreme Court of New York recognized this in stating the
following:
The legislature must be given the first opportunity to
reform the current system. . . . That said, the court’s
deference to the coordinate branches of State government
is contingent on these branches taking effective and timely
action to address the problems set forth in this option. The

212

463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983).
Id. at 598 (1983).
214
Id. at 599 (citing Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)).
215
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28.
216
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970). “New York is, of
course, in no way prohibited from using only state funds according to
whatever plan it chooses, providing it violates no provision of the
Constitution.” Id.
213
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parlous state of the City’s schools demands no less. The
court will not hesitate to intervene if it finds that the
legislative and/or executive branches fail to devise and
implement necessary reform.217
If the New York Legislature chooses to comply with 2001
CFE’s remedy, the court may be asked to intervene once more to
decide if the proposal disparately impacts minorities. The
intervention, however, will not require the court to look over the
shoulders of the New York State Legislature. Rather, the court
will make a simple calculation, comparing funding distributed to
minorities and whites in the state, and will intervene if the
comparison shows that the new funding scheme disparately
impacts minorities.218 If the proposal does disparately impacts
minorities, the court may issue an order to revoke the state’s
federal funding for education altogether.219 If it does not, no
further intervention is required.
Although the revocation of federal funding could be drastic,
having a deleterious effect on the program, there are safeguards
protecting against such an outcome. The Supreme Court has
stated that Spending Clause legislation allows states to make a
choice: either the state “compl[ies] with what a court has
announced is necessary to conform to federal law,” or the state
can “withdraw[] from the program.”220 If the state chooses to
comply, it must “prospectively perform [its] duties incident to the
receipt of federal money,” or the court may revoke those
funds.221
In the case of education funding, however, revocation of
funds would be antithetical to the goal of providing equal and
adequate education for all children.222 But if the state refuses to
217

2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 549-50.
See, e.g., 2001 CFE, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
219
See, e.g., Guardians v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582,
596 (1983) (citing Rosado, 397 U.S. at 420-21).
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
110 CONG. REC. 7065 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff), cited in
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 421 n.28 (1978).
“Obviously action to end discrimination is preferable since that reaches the
218
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comply, it is clear that the courts are left with no other choice
except to terminate federal funds.223 Fortunately, the political
process will most likely prevent state noncompliance resulting in
the withdrawal of federal funds for education.224 It seems beyond
reason that state legislators would fail to approve a funding
scheme that is nondiscriminatory, especially if their failure to do
so would result in drastic funding cuts to education. Such an
action would infuriate constituents and effectively sound the
death knell for any legislator seeking to remain in office.
In sum, a court ruling for plaintiffs on Title VI grounds will
avoid the problems inherent in equity and adequacy claims,
namely, reluctance to equalize funding and judicial activism.
Legislatures will be self-motivated to create funding schemes that
do not disparately impact minorities because Title VI threatens
states with the loss of federal funds otherwise. By removing the
remedy from the courts, the legislative decision of whether and
how to make funding schemes equitable and adequate will not be
questioned further by the courts. Upon a court’s finding that a
state’s funding scheme violates Title VI, the courts will simply
decide whether the remedy proposed by the legislature has a
disparate impact on minorities. There is, in effect, a
mathematical neutrality to the court’s role in enforcing Title VI
regulations claims.225
objective of extending the funds on a nondiscriminatory basis. But if the
discrimination persists and cannot be effectively terminated, how else can the
principle of nondiscrimination be vindicated except by nonpayment of funds?”
Id.
223
Id.
224
Cf. Baker, supra note 201, at 1941. “Few congressional
representatives, after all, should be eager to support legislation that gives the
states money only if they comply with a condition that a majority of their own
constituents would independently find unattractive.” Baker, supra note 201, at
1941. It follows then that state legislatures would comply with legislation that
a majority of their own constituents find attractive, such as legislation
providing for nondiscriminatory education fund distribution.
225
Two recent federal decisions show that the fourth wave is building
momentum. In Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 2000),
plaintiffs survived defendants’ motion to dismiss after bringing suit in federal
district court alleging that the state’s funding laws create a discriminatory
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CONCLUSION
Old wave claims are relatively unsuccessful because their
remedies play into courts’ fears of distributing equal funding in
the wake of Serrano v. Priest226 and judicial activism in the wake
of Brown v. Board of Education227 and, more recently, Abbott v.
Burke.228 Both federal and state equity claims have been harshly
criticized by scholars as inevitably decreasing states’ overall per
pupil spending, which in turn decreases student achievement.
Although less so than equity claims, adequacy claims have also
been criticized because they have been known to require decades
of further litigation to implement the initial ruling requiring
adequate funding for all school districts.
Title VI remedies evade the problems of equity and adequacy
claims while providing significant legislative discretion in
formulating a remedy without the need for excessive judicial
intervention. Because Title VI conditions the receipt of federal
funds on the non-discriminatory distribution of education
funding, a court’s role in developing and implementing remedies
associated with these claims will be greatly diminished. Courts
should look to see statistically whether minorities are
discriminated against in state education finance plans and then
disparate impact against the state’s minority students, non-U.S. origin
students, and disabled students in violation of Title VI. Likewise, in Ceaser v.
Pataki, No. 98 Civ. 8532, 2000 WL 1154318 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000), a
lower court held that a complaint alleging that “educational services provided
by a school system are disproportionately less beneficial to members of one
race than another” is a validly stated claim under Title VI. Id. at *4. The
complaint alleged that defendants, including Governor Pataki and the State of
New York, have adopted a policy of not enforcing New York State education
law requiring that the state provide school districts with “certified teachers,
remedial instruction, school facilities and grounds, libraries, and regents
courses and diplomas.” Id. See also Paynter v. State, 220 N.Y.S.2d 712
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss a Title VI
regulation claim that state law has an adverse discriminatory impact on
African-American and Latino students).
226
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
227
347 U.S. 483 (1973).
228
575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
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leave developing and implementing the remedies to the state
legislatures. Under the circumstances, claims will undoubtedly be
more successful and more consistent than claims brought under
the old waves, and could perhaps be the new wave in education
finance litigation. For these reasons, the plaintiffs in 2001 CFE
should succeed before the New York Court of Appeals, setting
solid precedent upon which the fourth wave can be built.

